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Abstract 
Multihop  wireless  networks  rely  on  node  cooperation  to  provide  multicast  services.  The  multihop 
communication offers increased coverage for such services but also makes them more vulnerable to insider (or 
Byzantine) attacks coming from compromised nodes that behave arbitrarily to disrupt the network. In this work, 
we identify vulnerabilities of on-demand multicast routing protocols for multihop wireless networks and discuss 
the challenges encountered in designing mechanisms to defend against them. We propose BSMR, a novel secure 
multicast routing protocol designed to withstand insider attacks from colluding adversaries. Our protocol is a 
software-based solution and does not require additional or specialized hardware. We present simulation results 
that demonstrate that BSMR effectively mitigates the identified attacks.  
Key Terms: Multihop wireless networks, secure multicast routing, Byzantine resiliency, Byzantine attacks.
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
MULTICAST routing protocols deliver data 
from a source to multiple destinations organized in a 
multicast  group.  In  the  last  few  years,  several 
protocols were proposed to provide multicast services 
for multihop wireless networks. A major challenge in 
designing protocols for wireless networks is ensuring 
robustness  to  failures  and  resilience  to  attacks. 
Wireless  networks  provide  a  less  robust 
communication than wired networks due to frequent 
broken links and a higher error rate. Security is also 
more  challenging  in  multihop  wireless  networks 
because  the  open  medium  is  more  susceptible  to 
outside  attacks  and  the  multihop  communication 
makes  services  more  vulnerable  to  insider  attacks 
coming  from  compromised  nodes.  Although  an 
effective  mechanism  against  outside  attacks, 
authentication  is  not  sufficient  to  protect  against 
insider  attacks  because  an  adversary  that 
compromised a node also gained access to the node’s 
cryptographic keys. Insider attacks are also known as 
Byzantine  attacks  and  protocols  able  to  provide 
service in their presence are referred to as Byzantine-
resilient  protocols.  Security  aspects  in  multicast 
protocols  relate  to  either  routing-specific  security, 
such  as  managing  the  routing  structure  and  data 
forwarding, or application-specific security, such as 
data confidentiality and authenticity. In this work, we 
are  concerned  with  multicast-routing-specific 
security.  Several  differences  make  the  multicast 
communication  model  more  challenging  than  its 
unicast  counterpart.  Designing  secure  multicast 
protocols  for  wireless  networks  requires  a  more 
complex trust model, as nodes that are members of 
the multicast group cannot simply organize  
 
themselves in a dissemination structure without the 
help  of  other  nonmember  nodes  acting  as  routers. 
Unlike  unicast  protocols,  which  establish  and 
maintain  routes  between  two  nodes,  multicast 
protocols  usually  establish  and  maintain  more 
complex  structures  such  as  trees  or  mehes.  For 
example, protocols relying on trees require additional 
operations such as route activation, tree pruning, and 
tree merging. These actions do not have a counterpart 
in  the  unicast  case  and  may  expose  the  routing 
protocol  to  new  vulnerabilities.  Last  but  not  least, 
multicast protocols deliver data from one sender to 
multiple  receivers,  making  scalability  a  major 
problem when designing attack-resilient protocols. In 
particular,  solutions  that  offer  resiliency  against 
Byzantine  attacks  for  unicast  are  not  scalable  in  a 
multicast  setting.  For  example,  multipath  routing 
affects  significantly  the  data  dissemination 
efficiency,  while  strategies  based  on 
acknowledgments have high network overhead.  
 
II.  SYSTEM ANALYSIS 
Multihop  wireless  networks  rely  on  node 
cooperation  to  provide  multicast  services.  The 
multihop  communication  offers  increased  coverage 
for  such  services  but  also  makes  them  more 
vulnerable to insider (or Byzantine) attacks coming 
from  compromised  nodes  that  behave  arbitrarily  to 
disrupt the network. 
 
Existing System: 
Wireless  networks  provide  a  less  robust 
communication than wired networks due to frequent 
broken links and a higher error rate. Security is also 
more  challenging  in  multihop  wireless  networks 
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because  the  open  medium  is  more  susceptible  to 
outside  attacks  and  the  multihop  communication 
makes  services  more  vulnerable  to  insider  attacks 
coming  from  compromised  nodes.  Although  an 
effective  mechanism  against  outside  attacks, 
authentication  is  not  sufficient  to  protect  against 
insider  attacks  because  an  adversary  that 
compromised a node also gained access to the node’s 
cryptographic keys. Insider attacks are also known as 
Byzantine  attacks  and  protocols  able  to  provide 
service in their presence are referred to as Byzantine-
resilient protocols. 
 
Proposed System: 
We  propose  BSMR,  a  secure  on-demand 
multicast  protocol  for  multihop  wireless  networks 
that provides resiliency against a representative set of 
strong Byzantine attacks (black hole, wormhole, and 
flood  rushing).  BSMR  uses  a  selective  data 
forwarding  mitigation  mechanism  based  on  a 
reliability  metric that captures adversarial behavior. 
Nodes determine the reliability of links by comparing 
the perceived data rate with the one advertised by the 
source. Adversarial links are avoided during the route 
discovery phase. BSMR also prevents attacks that try 
to  prevent  or  arbitrarily  influence  route 
establishment. 
 
III. IMPLEMENTATION 
The first step in developing anything is to 
state the requirements. This applies just as much to 
leading edge research as to simple programs and to 
personal programs, as well as to large team efforts. 
Being  vague  about  your  objective  only  postpones 
decisions  to  a  later  stage  where  changes  are  much 
more costly. 
The problem statement should state what is 
to be done and not how it is to be done. It should be a 
statement of needs, not a proposal for a solution. A 
user manual for the desired system is a good problem 
statement.  The  requestor  should  indicate  which 
features  are  mandatory  and  which  are  optional,  to 
avoid  overly  constraining  design  decisions.  The 
requestor should avoid describing system internals, as 
this restricts implementation flexibility. Performance 
specifications  and  protocols  for  interaction  with 
external  systems  are  legitimate  requirements. 
Software  engineering  standards,  such  as  modular 
construction, design for testability, and provision for 
future extensions, are also proper.   Many  problems 
statements,  from  individuals,  companies,  and 
government  agencies,  mixture  requirements  with 
design  decisions.  There  may  sometimes  be  a 
compelling reason to require a particular computer or 
language; there is rarely justification to specify the 
use  of  a  particular  algorithm.  The  analyst  must 
separate  the  true  requirements  from  design  and 
implementation decisions disguised as requirements. 
The  analyst  should  challenge  such  pseudo 
requirements, as they restrict flexibility. There may 
be politics or organizational reasons for the pseudo 
requirements,  but  at  least  the  analyst  should 
recognize  that  these  externally  imposed  design 
decisions  are  not  essential  features  of  the  problem 
domain. 
A problem statement may have more or less 
detail.  A  requirement  for  a  conventional  product, 
such as a payroll program or a billing system, may 
have  considerable  detail.  A  requirement  for  a 
research effort in a new area may lack many details, 
but  presumably  the  research  has  some  objective, 
which should be clearly stated. 
Most  problem  statements  are  ambiguous, 
incomplete, or even inconsistent. Some requirements 
are  just  plain  wrong.  Some  requirements,  although 
precisely stated, have unpleasant consequences on the 
system  behavior  or  impose  unreasonable 
implementation  costs.  Some  requirements  seem 
reasonable at first but do not work out as well as the 
request or thought. The problem statement is just a 
starting point for understanding the problem, not an 
immutable document. The purpose of the subsequent 
analysis  is  to  fully  understand  the  problem  and  its 
implications.  There  is  no  reasons  to  expect  that  a 
problem statement prepared without a fully analysis 
will be correct. 
The analyst must work with the requestor to 
refine  the  requirements  so  they  represent  the 
requestor’s true intent. This involves challenging the 
requirements  and  probing  for  missing  information. 
The  psychological,  organizational,  and  political 
considerations of doing this are beyond the scope of 
this book, except for the following piece of advice: If 
you do exactly what the customer asked for, but the 
result does not meet the customer’s real needs, you 
will probably be blamed anyway. 
 
Modules: 
1.  Route Discovery 
2.  Multicast Route Activation 
3.  Multicast Tree Maintenance 
4.  Selective Data Forwarding Mitigation 
 
1. Route Discovery 
BSMR’s route discovery allows a node that 
wants to join a group to find a route to the multicast 
tree.  The  protocol  follows  the  RREQ/RREP 
procedure used by on-demand routing protocols, with 
several  differences.  To  prevent  outsiders  from 
interfering,  all  route  discovery  messages  are 
authenticated using the public key corresponding to 
the  network  certificate.  Only  group-authenticated 
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each request. Tree nodes use the tree token to prove 
their tree status. 
 
2. Multicast Route Activation 
The  requester  signs  and  unicasts  on  the 
selected  route  a  multicast  activation  (MACT) 
message  that  includes  its  identifier,  the  group 
identifier,  and  the  sequence  number  used  in  the 
RREQ  phase.  The  MACT  message  also  includes  a 
one-way function applied on the tree token extracted 
from RREP which will be checked by the tree node 
that sent the RREP message to verify that the node 
that  activated  the  route  is  the  same  as  the  initial 
requester. An intermediate node on the route checks 
if  the  signature  on  MACT  is  valid  and  if  MACT 
contains the same sequence number as the one in the 
original RREQ. The node then adds to its list of tree 
neighbors the previous node and the next node on the 
route  as  downstream  and  upstream  neighbors, 
respectively,  and  sends  MACT  along  the  forward 
route. During the propagation of the MACT message, 
tree  neighbors  use  their  public  keys  to  establish 
pairwise shared keys, which will be used to securely 
exchange messages between tree neighbors. 
 
3. Multicast Tree Maintenance 
Routing  messages  exchanged  by  tree 
neighbors are authenticated using the pairwise keys 
shared between tree neighbors. If a malicious node 
prunes itself even if it has a subtree below it, the link 
repair  procedure  is  initiated  by  nodes  that  detect  a 
broken  link  and  is  similar  to  route  discovery.  The 
group  leader  periodically  broadcasts  in  the  entire 
network a signed GroupHello message that contains 
the  current  group  sequence  number,  the  tree  token 
authenticator,  and  the  hop  count  anchor.  A  signed 
GroupHello  message  containing  a  special  flag  also 
ensures  that  when  two  disconnected  trees  are 
merging, one of the group leaders is suppressed. 
 
4. Selective Data Forwarding Mitigation 
The source periodically signs and sends in 
the  tree  an  MRATE  message  that  contains  its  data 
transmission rate. As this message propagates in the 
multicast  tree,  nodes  may  add  their  perceived 
transmission rate to it. Each tree node keeps a copy of 
the last heard MRATE packet. The information in the 
MRATE  message  allows  nodes  to  detect  if  tree 
ancestors perform selective data forwarding attacks. 
Depending on whether their perceived rate is within 
acceptable limits of the rate in the MRATE message, 
nodes alternate between two states. The initial state 
of a node is disconnected; after it joins the multicast 
group and becomes aware of its expected receiving 
data rate, the node switches to the connected state. 
Upon detecting a selective data forwarding attack, the 
node switches back to the disconnected state. 
Attacks  Against  Multicast  Routing  Adversarial 
Model 
Nodes  may  exhibit  Byzantine  behavior, 
either alone or colluding with other nodes. Examples 
of  such  behavior  include  not  forwarding  packets, 
injecting,  modifying,  or  replaying  packets,  rushing 
packets,  and  creating  wormholes.  We  refer  to  any 
arbitrary  action  by  authenticated  nodes  resulting  in 
the  disruption  of  the  routing  service  as  Byzantine 
behavior  and  to  such  an  adversary  as  a  Byzantine 
adversary. Adversaries do not have control over the 
physical and MAC layers. We consider a three-level 
trust  model  that  captures  the  interactions  between 
nodes  in  a  wireless  multicast  setting  and  defines  a 
node’s  privileges:  the  first  level  consists  of  the 
source,  which  must  be  continually  available  and 
assumed not to be compromised (an unavailable or 
untrusted source makes the multicast service useless); 
the  second  level  consists  of  the  multicast  group 
member nodes, which are allowed to initiate requests 
for  joining  multicast  groups;  and  the  third  level 
consists  of  nonmember  nodes,  which  participate  in 
the routing but cannot initiate group join requests. In 
order  to  cope  with  Byzantine  attacks,  even  group 
members are not fully trusted. 
 
Fig. 1. Types of nodes in a multicast setting for ad 
hoc wireless networks. 
 
Attacks in Multicast in Multihop Wireless 
Networks 
An adversary can attack the control messages 
corresponding  to  the  route  discovery,  route 
activation,  and  tree  management  operations  or  can 
attack data messages. The route discovery phase can 
be disrupted by outside attackers creating undesired 
results by injecting, replaying, or modifying control 
packets. Nodes that are not in the tree can mislead 
other  nodes  into  believing  that  they  found  and  are 
connected to the tree. Nodes can flood the network 
with bogus requests for joining multicast groups. A 
Byzantine adversary can prevent a route from being 
established by dropping the request and/or response 
or can influence the route selection by using wireless-
specific attacks such as wormhole and flood rushing. 
A Byzantine adversary can also modify the packets 
carrying the route selection metric such as hop count 
or node identifiers.  An attacker can prevent a path 
from  being  activated  by  injecting  bogus  route 
activation  messages  or  by  dropping  correct  route 
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multicast group can initiate route activation packets 
to  more  than  one  tree  node,  which  may  result  in 
unnecessary branches being grafted to the multicast 
tree. Nodes can maliciously report that other links are 
broken  or  generate  incorrect  pruning  messages, 
resulting  in  correct  nodes  being  disconnected  from 
the  network  or  tree  partitioning.  In  the  absence  of 
authentication, any node can pretend to be the group 
leader.  Although  many  routing  protocols  do  not 
describe  how  to  select  a  new  group  leader  when 
needed, we note that the leader election protocol can 
also be influenced by attackers. Attacks against data 
messages  consist  of  eavesdropping,  modifying, 
replaying,  injecting  data,  or  selectively  forwarding 
data after being selected on a route. A special form of 
packet  delivery  disruption  is  a  denial-of-service 
attack,  in  which  the  attacker  overwhelms  the 
computational, sending or receiving capabilities of a 
node. In general, data source authentication, integrity, 
and  encryption  can  solve  the  first  attacks  and  are 
usually  considered  application-specific  security. 
Defending  against  selective  data  forwarding  and 
denial of service cannot be done exclusively by using 
cryptographic mechanisms. Because external attacks 
can be prevented using the authentication framework 
described, we focus on the following three Byzantine 
attacks: 
1.  Black  hole  attack.  One  or  several  adversaries    
forward  only  routing  control  packets,  while 
dropping all data packets. 
2.  Wormhole  attack.  Two  colluding  adversaries 
tunnel  packets  between  each  other  in  order  to 
create a shortcut in the network. The adversaries 
use the low cost appearance of the wormhole to 
increase  the  probability  of  being  selected  on 
paths; once selected on a path, they attempt to 
disrupt data delivery by executing a black hole 
attack. 
3.  Flood rushing attack. One or several adversaries 
rush an authenticated flood through the network 
before  the  flood  traveling  through  a  legitimate 
route.  This  allows  the  adversaries  to  control 
many  paths.  Flood  rushing  can  be  used  to 
increase  the  effectiveness  of  a  black  hole  or 
wormhole attack. 
 
SECURE MULTICAST ROUTING PROTOCOL 
BSMR Overview 
Our protocol, BSMR, ensures that multicast 
data is delivered from the source to the members of 
the  multicast  group,  even  in  the  presence  of 
Byzantine attackers, as long  as the group  members 
are reachable through non adversarial paths and a no 
adversarial path exists between a new member and a 
node  in  the  multicast  tree.  To  achieve  this  strong 
guarantee, BSMR builds on the basic operation of the 
tree-based  on-demand  protocol  presented.  To 
eliminate a large class of outside attacks, we use an 
authentication  framework  that  ensures  that  only 
authorized nodes can perform certain operations (e.g., 
only tree nodes can perform tree operations, and only 
nodes  that  possess  valid  group  certificates  can 
connect  to  the  group  multicast  tree).  For  example, 
only  member  nodes  can  send  RREQ  and  route 
activation messages, and only tree nodes can reply to 
route  activation  messages.  BSMR  mitigates  inside 
attacks that try to prevent a node from establishing a 
route to the  multicast tree by flooding both  RREQ 
and RREP and by using a time-out-based mechanism 
that ensures that a path is established even if route 
activation  messages  are  dropped.  If  an  adversarial 
free  route  exists,  BSMR  guarantees  that  a  route  is 
established.  BSMR  provides  resilience  to  selective 
data forwarding attacks by using a reliability metric 
that  captures  adversarial  behavior.  The  metric 
consists  of  a  list  of  link  weights  in  which  high 
weights  correspond  to  low  reliability.  Each  node 
maintains its own weight list and includes it in each 
RREQ to ensure that a new route to the tree avoids 
adversarial  links.  A  link’s  reliability  is  determined 
based  on  the  number  of  packets  successfully 
delivered on that link. Tree nodes monitor the rate of 
receiving  data  packets  and  compare  it  with  the 
transmission rate indicated by the source in the form 
of  a  multicast  rate  (MRATE)  message.  If  the 
perceived  transmission  rate  falls  below  the  rate 
indicated  in  the  MRATE  message  by  more  than  a 
threshold, an honest node that is a direct descendant 
of  an  adversarial  node  updates  its  weight  list  by 
penalizing  the  link  to  its  parent  and  then  tries  to 
discover  a  new  route  to  the  tree.  Only  weights 
corresponding  to  penalized  links  are  included  in 
RREQs. All no faulty links have a default weight of 
one.  Note  that  links  can  also  be  penalized  due  to 
natural losses. We do not differentiate between losses 
caused  by  adversarial  behavior  and  natural  losses 
because lossy links should be avoided just as well. 
 
IV. SCREENS 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
In  this  paper,  we  have  discussed  several 
aspects that make designing attack-resilient multicast 
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more  challenging  than  their  unicast  counterpart  we 
have proposed BSMR, a routing protocol that relies 
on novel general mechanisms to mitigate Byzantine 
attacks. BSMR identifies and avoids adversarial links 
based on a reliability metric associated with each link 
and capturing adversarial behavior. Our results show 
that  BSMR’s  strategy  is  effective  against  strong 
insider attacks such as wormholes, black holes, and 
flood rushing. 
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